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BOOK REVIEW
United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Com-
parative Guide. By Barry E. Hawk. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich. 1979. Pp. xv, 946. $75.
For many lawyers, antitrust law now provides both an end in itself-a field
of practice, an area for study and analysis, a pulpit for preaching-and the
essential conceptual framework within which to view and to control the
activities of American business at home and abroad. No other American
regulatory concept or principle has provided as broad, as powerful, and as
long-enduring a focus as that afforded by the Sherman, Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts. Europeans frequently (and accurately) ac-
cuse Americans of being obsessed by the antitrust laws and, consequently, of
ignoring other possible economic regimes and substituting the pursuit of
competition for the "pursuit of happiness." The past twenty years have seen
the growth of foreign legislation to control restrictive business practices,
particularly in the European Common Market, but the practice of the art
remains uniquely American.
Barry Hawk's comparative guide to international antitrust comes at a
singularly auspicious time. The principal predecessor treatises by Brewster'
and Fugate2 were first published some twenty years ago. The literature on the
subject, which Professor Hawk marshals to an almost numbing extent, has
continued to multiply, but Professor Hawk's work is unique and important in
several respects. Part One of the book provides an updated restatement of
American antitrust law and practices in the international field. Parts Two and
Three examine, respectively, the competition rules of the European Common
Market and the further "international" practice exemplified by various draft
codes and guidelines and the national legislation of selected developing
countries. They permit the reader to make comparisons "to illuminate differ-
ences and similarities" between the various regimes for regulating "restrictive
business practices."'3
Professor Hawk explains that his book evolved from a set of materials used
for seminars and that this origin brought about the format of the book,
particularly its emphasis on primary source materials. Certainly the book
succeeds brilliantly in this respect; one can confidently predict that it will be
an extraordinarily useful work for classroom presentations, illustrating the
"differences and similarities" in objectives, procedures and application which
obtain in the widely varying legal systems of the world. The primary focus of
the book is "examination of existing and proposed legal rules," not in
"hornbook" fashion but through the provision of primary and secondary
materials. 4 In at least two of the three areas, Hawk is quite successful; the
1. K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad (1958).
2. W. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws (2d ed. 1973).
3. B. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative
Guide, at vi (1979).
4. Id. at vii.
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restatement of American law in the international field is encyclopedic and
up-to-date while the summary of the European Economic Community
(EEC) rules and their application is one of the most comprehensive which has
yet appeared on either side of the Atlantic. Hawk is less fortunate in his
international section, but here it is the materials which fail him. The lack of
focus and the inconsistent viewpoints in evidence in the materials themselves
make almost impossible any unifying overview or theme.
Professor Hawk expressly cautions the reader that "considerations of interna-
tional economics and foreign relations are not directly examined at any length,
although they arise implicitly throughout the book." s It is clear that the author
has not attempted to deal directly with economic issues, and such a decision was
fundamentally wise. An examination of the relevant economic issues would have
enormously expanded the scope and length of the work and caused it to lose its
legal focus. Hawk goes on to note that:
Antitrust or competition policy is but one of many elements which should go into the
formulation and execution of a nation's general foreign economic policy. Other considera-
tions and national interests are involved, some of which may be given greater weight than
antitrust policies. These include, among others: national security, military and diplomatic
considerations; monetary, balance of payment and fiscal policies; and tariff and other
protectionist policies. The application of United States antitrust laws in the international
trade area must be understood against this background of differing and sometimes
conflicting national policies and interests.6
As Hawk recalls, in 1958 Professor Kingman Brewster posed a series of
questions concerning the decision of the United States to apply its antitrust laws
generally to its foreign commerce. Two of the questions which Brewster raised
were:
d. Should we presumptively defer to foreign interests, policies, and laws when the
matter concerned is within their jurisdiction?
e. To what extent should we be guided by what other governments say as against our own
judgment about what is in the long run the best interests of their countries?7
One of the most absorbing parts of Hawk's text is his discussion of the jurisdic-
tional judgment which is involved in any answer to these two questions. Hawk
retraces the familiar territory of American Banana,8 Sisal Sales,9 and Alcoa'0
and provides a wealth of unfamiliar information and a rich analysis of the
so-called "effects test" in the latter case. There now appears to be a general
consensus in favor of a "balance of interests" approach to international antitrust
regulation. As enunciated in TimberlaneII and Mannington Mills, 12 the ac-
cepted approach seems to require a determination by the court that "the interests
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1.
7. K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad 11-12 (1958), quoted in B. Hawk,
supra note 3, at 2-3.
8. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
9. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
10. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).




of, and links to, the United States-including the magnitude of the effect on
American foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-it-vis those of other
nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority."'1 3 In applying the
jurisdictional "rule of reason" advocated by Professor Brewster, this approach
relies heavily on the conflict of law approach set forth in sections 18 and 40 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. The latter section states the
principles of forebearance to which courts should look in tempering their exer-
cises of jurisdiction in cases where two or more states have jurisdiction. In
assessing the degree of conflict which exists between American antitrust law and
foreign law or policy, it is necessary to consider the type, goals and implementa-
tion of the conflicting foreign policy or policies.
Unfortunately, Hawk points out, the Justice Department has sometimes
chosen to give a narrower reading to section 40 in antitrust situations. In his 1978
ABA speech, Assistant Attorney General Shenefield proclaimed that the Anti-
trust Division endorsed the restatement of section 40 by Judge Choy in Timber-
lane. In so doing, Mr. Shenefield emphasized that, in the Division's view, the
courts are not required to balance the interests of the American parties against
those of the other nations involved, but only "that the interest of the United
States in prosecuting the violation be measured both quantitatively and
qualitatively against the potential damage to United States foreign relations
generally that might result.' 1 4 I agree with Professor Hawk that this reading
does not adequately weigh the interests of the other nations involved since it
weighs only the respective American interests in enforcement and in avoiding
foreign relations "embarrassments."
Professor Hawk goes on to criticize the so-called territorial limitation on the
act of state and foreign government compulsion defenses proposed by the Anti-
trust Division in its International Antitrust Guide (and also in the Government
briefs in Bechtel'5 and Hunt' 6). He notes that the major policy consideration
which underlies the sovereign compulsion and act of state defenses is that of
fairness to a defendant who is caught between conflicting demands from two or
more sovereigns. In the event of such a conflict, fairness requires rejection of any
"mechanical rule requiring all aspects of the foreign act to take place within the
sovereign's territory"1 and suggests the propriety of the balancing of interests
approach suggested in Timberlane.
Hawk observes that foreign antitrust discovery has generated most of the
international controversy, with the major discovery issue in antitrust cases today
that of foreign limitations on discovery. His text was written before the intro-
duction of the United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Bill in 1979.
Briefly stated, this bill would enable the British Secretary of State to prohibit
13. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1977).
14. Address by John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the
ABA International Law Section (Aug. 9, 1978), quoted in B. Hawk, supra note 3, at 41 n.74.
15. United States v. Bechtel Corp., Civil No. C-76-99 (GBH) (N.D. Cal.), Department ofJustice
Response to Comments Received Regarding Proposed Final Judgment, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,933 (Mar.
28, 1978).
16. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
17. B. Hawk, supra note 3, at 132.
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compliance with foreign requests for production of documents, preclude actions
in the United Kingdom to enforce sums payable under foreign multiple damage
awards, and permit British residents to recover in British actions the non-
compensatory portion of any such foreign judgments. The United States Ambas-
sador to England, who by glorious coincidence is none other than Kingman
Brewster, expressed the concern of the American government on the provisions
of the bill by note dated November 9, 1979 to the British government. In a reply
note, dated November 27, 1979, the British Ambassador to the United States
returned the compliments of Her Majesty's Government, including the follow-
ing:
Her Majesty's Government believe that two basically undesirable consequences follow
from the enforcement of public law in this field by private remedies. First, the usual
discretion of a public authority to enforce laws in a way which has regard to the interest of
society is replaced by a motive on the part of the plaintiff to pursue defendants for private
gain thus excluding international considerations of a public nature. Secondly, where
criminal and civil penalties co-exist, those engaged in international trade are exposed to
double jeopardy.
Her Majesty's Government consider that there are further aspects of U.S. civil penal
procedure under the Anti-Trust Acts which are questionable in their application to
non-U.S. nationals engaged in international trade. A defendant does not have to be
present in the U.S. for jurisdiction to be exercised by the courts of that country over him.
In the defendant's absence the allegations contained in the plaintiff's pleadings are
accepted, i.e. failure to appear in the U.S. court is treated as tantamount to an admission
of guilt. Wide and prejudicial discovery procedures are enforced. The potential penalties
can be enormous and totally out of proportion to alleged mischief, particularly where the
activities concerned were entirely legal where they occurred.
Finally, and most important, the U.S. courts claim subject matter jurisdiction over
activities of non-U.S. persons outside the U.S.A. to an extent which is quite unacceptable
to the U. K. and many other nations. Although in recognition of international objections to
the wide reach of anti-trust law enforcement in civil cases, the U.S. courts have begun to
devise tests which may limit the circumstances in which the remedy may be available,
these tests remain within these wider claims to jurisdiction to which Her Majesty's
Government object. 18
This exchange between two old allies underlines the truth of Lord Wilber-
force's remark, quoted by Professor Hawk, that "[i]t is axiomatic that in antitrust
matters the policy of one state may be to defend what it is the policy of another
state to attack." 19 Is there a better way than the present regime of national
regulation, tempered by wise application of conflict of law principles? Part Three
of Hawk's work reports a few of the repeated attempts since World War II to
fashion an international antitrust law, from the ill-fated Havana Charter to the
current attempts in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
to agree on "codes" of principles to guide the international regulation of "restric-
tive business principles" and the transfer of technology. These discussions,
between representatives of the developed nations, the Communist East Bloc
governments and the so-called "Group of 7 7" developing countries, are no longer
chiefly negotiations about antitrust principles. The substance of the debate in
18. Comments of Her Majesty's Government on Note No. 56 from the United States Ambas-
sador in London (Note No. 225) (Nov. 27, 1979) (on file with the Fordham Law Ret'iew).
19. Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [19781 2 W.L.R. 81, 94, quoted in B. Hawk,
supra note 3, at 341.
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both arenas now concerns the developing world's demand that the developed
world transfer to it, on as favorable a basis as can be achieved, both the resources
and the tools for its accelerated development. The legal discussions-still em-
balmed in the deceptively legal language of much of the texts-have been
overtaken by the haute politique of development and ideological maneuver by
the respective power blocs, whose attitudes toward antitrust unsurprisingly are
as disparate and irreconcilable as their economic and political regimes. What
began as a proud crusade by the United States has increasingly come to resemble
a desperate series of rear guard actions fought for many different objectives.
I regret that the stringencies of space do not permit a more complete discussion
of the many virtues of Hawk's work-for example, his incisive discussions of the
legality of foreign exclusive selling arrangements (Hawk rejects the Antitrust
Division's suggestion, in Case J of the International Antitrust Guide, 20 of prob-
able per se illegality), mergers and acquisitions, and joint ventures. His 375 pages
on EEC antitrust principles and their application are also very informative. For
this reader, however, Hawk's discussion of jurisdiction and the act of state and
foreign sovereign compulsion defenses is particularly outstanding, illuminating
the dangers and inadequacies, respectively, of both unilateralism and mul-
tilateralism and the essentiality of the balancing of interests approach in situa-
tions of possible conflict. Professor Hawk's thoughtful text demonstrates that
Timberlane, rather than Alcoa, now points the way.
D.G. Gill*
20. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations, Case J (1977).
* Member of the New York Bar.
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